Networks Do Not Float Freely: (Dis)entangling the Politics of Tamil Diaspora Inclusion in Development Governance by Craven, Catherine Ruth
Received: 15 August 2019 Revised: 10October 2020 Accepted: 24October 2020
DOI: 10.1111/glob.12314
OR I G I N A L A RT I C L E
Networks do not float freely: (Dis)entangling the
politics of Tamil diaspora inclusion in development
governance
Catherine Ruth Craven














Scholarship on diaspora engagement strategies has suggested
that such strategies are embedded either in binary state-
diaspora relations, or global structures of domination. This
paper builds on the idea that diaspora engagement is con-
textually embedded but complicates the understanding of
this context, by moving beyond structuralist or state-centric
models. It draws on a range of relational theories, to suggest
that diaspora engagement strategies in the development
field are contextually embedded in complex entanglements
of power relations. Data from a multi-method study of the
Tamil diaspora in Toronto, from 2009 to 2018, reveals that
inclusion in these diaspora engagement strategies is shaped
by an entanglement of power relations, which include social
networks, and legitimacy claims in overlapping cultural fields,
but also spatial relations, whereby geography and material
resources are often-overlooked dimensions of this space.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2016, about a half-dozen representatives of non-profit organisationsworking in international devel-
opment gathered in the Centre for Social Innovation (CSI) on Spadina Avenue in downtown Toronto to form what
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would become the Diaspora Engagement Networking Group (DENG). The meeting was facilitated by the Ontario
Council for International Cooperation (OCIC), a Canadian government-funded organisationwhosemission it is to con-
nect and build the capacity of its member organisationsworking in the international development sector. Themeeting
was attended by representatives of organisations who were working with diaspora that had ‘diaspora engagement’
written into their strategy, as well as some who self-identified as members of a diaspora. Amongst them were inter-
national NGOs (INGOs) like Cuso International, with many years of experience implementing diaspora and develop-
ment programmes, as well as local diaspora-run organisations still in the process of applying for charitable status.
Whilst the OCIC representative facilitated the session, they made clear that members should take charge. Partici-
pants revealed mixed reasons for attendance and also a broad range of understandings of what ‘diaspora’ meant to
them. Most had only a vague understanding of the term but felt like it could be a useful frame to get their community
to rally behind the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs), and most revealed an urge to leverage their privileged
position in Canada. After this initial meeting in 2016, the group proceeded tomeet semi-regularly, to exchange knowl-
edge on how best to engage other diaspora individuals and organisations, and to discuss the functioning of the net-
working group itself. The group also organised a joint panel discussion at a global conference on the SDGs in Toronto
in 2017, and designed and conducted a survey of organisations working with or through diaspora on any aspect of
the SDGs.
Far from an epiphenomenal event, I suggest that the Toronto-basedDENG is of broader global political importance
in that it presents an example of a diaspora engagement strategy. In this paper, I define diaspora as individual and col-
lective agents that mobilize socially, politically or economically towards a homeland in which they do not permanently
reside. Further, I define diaspora engagement strategies as the policies and practices tomanage diaspora involvement
in political processes. Fromexisting research,we know that there has been a rapid rise amongstmigrant sending states
in the designing of strategies to engage their diaspora populations (Délano, 2014; Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Gamlen
et al., 2013; Mylonas, 2013; Ragazzi, 2009, 2014, 2017); e.g. through extraterritorial voting rights or dual citizenship
schemes. But there has also been an increase in practices that specifically target diaspora mobilization in the field of
development. In this paper I use the term development to denote a global ‘field’ structured around the problem of
‘development’, with actors struggling over what development is, and how it can be achieved, albeit from different posi-
tions of power.1 Development governance then describes one outcome of such a struggle whereby it has emerged
that development needs to be managed, i.e. via rule setting, or the promotion of particular practices. Diaspora contri-
butions to development then need to be equally managed; diaspora strategically ‘engaged’. For example, actors such
as the EU, the World Bank, NGOs and the private sector, have devised strategies to manage global remittance flows
(Ratha, 2003) and their impact on development, through implementing micro-banking schemes and taxation. Dias-
pora engagement strategies in international development may also include holding policy consultations with diaspora
on international aid policy, creating knowledge exchange and volunteering programmes, building diaspora organisa-
tional capacity to deliver programmes in home countries, and providing opportunities for networking in the diaspora’s
new country of residence, as outlined in the vignette.
Why is this important? Besides leveraging diaspora remittances for economic growth, the stated purpose of dias-
pora engagement in the development field is often to ‘include diasporas in decision-making’. As the above example of
the DENG illustrates, diaspora engagement strategies are described in such a way that emphasizes transparency and
participation in line with dominant norms in the international development field. Yet, in doing so they often establish
different kinds of barriers to participation in development governance. Diaspora engagement strategies do not simply
provide space for localised and non-hierarchical cooperation and knowledge exchange. They create new hierarchies
amongst diaspora organisations, foster certain behaviours and practices over others, leading to a reshuffling of the
international development field as a whole, or simply reifying already existing global power dynamics.
How do we make sense of the DENG and diaspora engagement strategies more broadly? Why was the DENG
formed and what was its purpose? At this point in time, Sri Lanka did not have an official ‘diaspora strategy’, and was
not a country systematically ‘embracing’ or ‘tapping’ its diaspora, for development purposes or otherwise. Besides, the
phenomenon described here takes place in a host country setting. But neither in Canada could a formal engagement
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policy be identified. After the election of 2015 had brought Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party into power, Global Affairs
Canada (GAC), had just replaced the Department of foreign affairs, trade and development (DFATD), and the new
government had not yet formulated an official international assistance policy. Scholarship on ‘diaspora engagement
strategies’ that are grounded in the homeor host states, thus do not seem fully equipped to dealwith the phenomenon
under investigation. But neither do critical structuralist approaches that see diaspora engagement as a function of
global capitalism (Ragazzi, 2014; Varadarajan, 2008, 2010), or the maintenance of liberal order in the global South
(Laffey & Nadarajah, 2012). Whilst the emphasis on structural dynamics and constraints is compelling, such macro-
approaches tend to brush over local variation in the political struggles that might inform diaspora engagement strate-
gies, and states remain the primary units of analysis. That the formation of the DENG was fairly ad hoc, its operation
driven bymicro-interactions between actors atmultiple scales, only becomes evidentwhenwemove away from a top-
down view of already formalised diaspora policies. With this in mind, some scholars of national diaspora strategies
have called for increased attention to the micro-foundations of these strategies (Mylonas & Delano, 2017). I will fol-
low the lead of these scholars, butwill apply themicro-lens to diaspora strategies in the development field, rather than
centering single state bureaucracies. Amicro-perspectivewill also complicate the picture ofwho engages and governs
diaspora, as there is evidence to suggest that diaspora should be conceptualized not just as subjects that are engaged,
but as governance actors in and of themselves, with the capacity to influence global political processes (Craven, 2018).
Evidently, the nature of diaspora inclusion in development governance needs to be better understood, but in a way
that eschews the binary of being either purely state driven vs. a symptom of the expansion of neoliberal governmen-
tality practices across the globe. This paper seeks to rise to that challenge, by building on data collected during nine
months of fieldwork for my PhD amongst members of the Tamil diaspora in Toronto, Canada. By assuming an ethno-
graphic perspective on diaspora engagement strategies, this paper will deepen our understanding of what constrains
and enables diaspora inclusion in development governance. By drawing on relational theories, I will disentangle a num-
ber of power relations that shape instances of diaspora inclusion in development governance, namely connectivity,
legitimacy, and spatiality. I will argue that the inclusion of diaspora in development governance processes and prac-
tices is always conditioned by the interrelationship between these dimensions, rather than just one or the other.
This paperwill proceed as follows. It will first situate this study in relation to existing literature on diaspora engage-
ment. It will examine explanations for the emergence and proliferation of suchmechanismswithin (emigration) states,
at the global level, as well as taking a look at theories that emphasise the contextual embeddedness of diaspora mobi-
lization. Next, the paper will sketch an alternative analytical framework by engaging with relational theories and the
spatial turn in IR, including theories on socio-spatial positionality andassemblage thinking, tobroadenourunderstand-
ing of the power relations that diaspora engagement strategies are embeddedwithin. This sectionwill also outline the
research design. The following sectionwill thendiscuss research findings. Iwill introduce historical data frommy study
of the Toronto-based Tamil diaspora and their encounterswith and inclusion in development governance, centering on
the period between the end of the civil war in 2009 until immediately after the 2015 Canadian elections. This will
set the scene for a more in-depth analysis of ethnographic data collected at various events centering diaspora and
development in Toronto. Ultimately, I will show that each instance of purported diaspora ‘engagement’ or inclusion
in development governance entails that diaspora actors must carefully navigate their position in professional, organi-
sational and diasporic networks, balance questions around legitimacy (specifically effectiveness and representation),
and secure economic capital to ensurematerial access to spaces of decision-making.
THE POLITICS OF ‘DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT’
A rich and substantive literature has emerged in recent years that explains the formation and spread of diaspora
engagement strategies (Délano, 2014; Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Gamlen, 2014, 2019; Gamlen et al., 2013; Ragazzi,
2014, 2017). This literature takes as its conceptual starting point the ‘deterritorialization of the nation state’ (Basch
et al., 2005), empirically manifesting in the increase in mechanisms, policies, institutions and practices that have
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emerged to channel the (potential for) economic and social remittances of diaspora populations. Scholarship has
tended to focus on formal policies, for example the extension of voting rights, special visa programmes or the cre-
ation of diaspora engagement institutions by home states. Indeed, most of this literature suggests that diaspora
engagement politics are firmly embedded in relations between the diaspora and its home state (Gamlen et al., 2013;
Koinova&Tsourapas, 2018;Kuschminder&Siegel, 2011;Mylonas, 2013; Tsourapas, 2018, 2020), and that states ‘gov-
ern’ or manage their diaspora according to national interests. Differing reasons have been given to explain why states
might have an interest in ‘engaging’ their diaspora populations. Diaspora engagement strategies have been conceptu-
alized as exercises in nation-building, or economic calculation. Gamlen et al. (2013) have created a typology of reasons
for the proliferation of diaspora engagement institutions. They suggest that some states seek to ‘tap’ their diaspora for
economic gain, or ‘embrace’ them for symbolic gain, whilst others create diaspora engagement policies due to ‘norm
diffusion’. One criticism that has been levelled at this literature is that it has tended to focus on the extraterritorial
practices of democratic states. These practices are, on thewhole, designed to encourage transnationalism, rather than
suppress it. In contrast, buildingonground-breakingworkbyLaurieBrand (2006),whichprecedes the turn to ‘diaspora
engagement policies’, a growing group of scholars has begun to study the extraterritorial practices of authoritarian
states (Dalmasso et al., 2017; Glasius, 2018; Tsourapas, 2015, 2018, 2020). Authoritarian states, these scholars argue,
show us that there exists a darker side to diaspora engagement, one that is perhaps less enshrined in formal policies
and institutions and that is drivenby state’s security concerns.As such theymayconstrain transnational political action
(Chaudhary &Moss, 2019), by repressing and intimidating expatriate dissidents (Moss, 2016; Öztürk & Tas, 2019).
Further, whilst the bulk of literature on diaspora engagement has centered empirically on the (liberal or authoritar-
ian) emigration state, some scholars have concerned themselves with decentering the state in the study of diaspora
engagement strategies because "both state and non-state agents are implicated in these projects" (Ho 2011, see also
Craven 2018). Similarly, others have noted that studies of diaspora engagement strategies "need to focus more on
actors and spaces" beyond the state (Delano&Gamlen 2014; Adamson 2016). Heading these calls, Gamlen sheds light
onhowdiasporapolicies relate towider global governanceprocesses. In his 2014article, hedrawson the literatureson
policy diffusion and epistemic communities, as well as governmentality theory, to make the argument that ‘the rise of
diaspora institutions is driven by efforts to form a coherent but decentralized system of global migration governance’
(Gamlen, 2014, 192). In his follow-up book, Gamlen (2019) then suggests that this increased effort to build a global
migration governance regime is fostering ‘strategic competition over populations rather than territories’, or what he
callsHuman Geopolitics.
In thewakeof the increased attention payedbyboth states andother global governance actors to diaspora, authors
have pointed their analytical lens at structural forces that drive state−diaspora relations, and thus explain the rise
of diaspora engagement strategies. In contrast to the more policy-oriented literature, they make explicit the often-
exploitative power relations, which underlie diaspora engagement practices. Some have argued that through engaging
diaspora, states seek to increase their power andbuild their capacities. However, accounts differ in termsof the nature
of the structure or logic that shapes diaspora engagement. For example, Varadarajan (2008) suggests that contem-
porary state attitudes towards diaspora must be understood as part of the hegemony of a neoliberal global political
economy, whereby diaspora communities offer opportunities for expanding the global capitalist system, in favour of
powerful Western states. Meanwhile, Ragazzi (2014) uses Foucauldian governmentality theory to explain why states
are increasingly interested in engaging their respective diaspora, in an effort to reproduce the global political econ-
omy. Similarly, Laffey andNadarajah (2012) suggest that diaspora engagement formspart of a liberal government logic,
albeit this time as part of a larger effort to securitize and generate liberal order in the global South. These accounts illu-
minate how diaspora engagement strategies are embedded in a discursive or political economy structure, dominated
by state capitalism and hierarchies of global exploitation.Whilst the emphasis on structural dynamics and constraints
is compelling, such macro-approaches tend to brush over local variation in the political struggles that inform dias-
pora engagement strategies. States remain the primary units of analysis and are assumed – a priori – to be the main
locus of power in global politics. Further, whilst, these approaches allow us to conceptualize constraints to diaspora
engagement beyond single state interests, they limit our thinking about possibilities for counter-hegemonic action
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and diaspora agency, and do not take into account variation or interpretations of policies in particular social or politi-
cal contexts.
Other authors have sought to decenter the state by looking inside, rather than beyond it. For example, Délano and
Mylonas’ (2017) JEMS special issue explores themicro-foundations of diaspora politics. I intend to build on this work,
but apply the micro-lens not to single state bureaucracies, but rather to diaspora strategies in the development field.
Such a micro-perspective will also complicate the picture of who engages or governs diaspora, as there is evidence
to suggest that diaspora should be conceptualized not just as subjects that are engaged, but as governance actors in
and of themselves, with the capacity to influence global policy processes from the agenda setting to the delivery stage
(Craven, 2018). The lines between governors and governed thus become increasingly blurred.Diaspora are disciplined
and managed, but they also organise and engage in collective action. Thus, in order to understand the nature of dias-
pora inclusion in development governance, specifically the micro-foundations of diaspora engagement strategies, it is
essential that we look at the rich literature that exists on diasporamobilization, in the area of development, but also in
international politics more generally.
Building on early empirical studies that explored the role of diaspora in conflict and post-conflict reconstruction
(Adamson, 2002, 2013; Baser & Swain, 2008; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Demmers, 2002; Koinova, 2018; Lyons, 2007;
Mohamoud, 2005; Orjuela, 2008; Shain, 2002; Van Hear & Cohen, 2017; Zunzer, 2004) the role of diaspora in (post-
conflict) development has been increasingly explored (Bakewell, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2008, 2011; Newland & Patrick,
2004; Pellerin & Mullings, 2013; Sinatti & Horst, 2015; Turner & Kleist, 2013; Van Hear et al., 2004). Empirically,
studies have shown that diaspora mobilization for development ranges from indirect contributions to development
like remittance sending (Helweg, 1983; Ratha et al., 2007), innovation (Minto-Coy, 2016) and knowledge transfer
(Tejada in Chikanda et al., 2016), to more direct contributions such as volunteering locally (Darieva, 2017), con-
tributing to infrastructure (re)development, especially in post-conflict settings (Kleist, 2018), and even institutional
redesign and restructuring of public services in the homeland (Craven, 2018). Meanwhile, theoretical explorations
of the link between diaspora and development have focussed on conceptualizing diaspora capacity and agency to
contribute to development. An early study by Brinkerhoff (2008) explored empirically how diaspora contribute to
development in their homelands, whilst in later work she conceptualizes diaspora as brokers or norm entrepreneurs
with an ‘in-between advantage’. The concept of the in-between advantage suggests that agency/power is in some
way intrinsic to diasporic individuals, who are uniquely positioned and thus prone to entrepreneurialism. The idea
of the entrepreneurial diaspora resonates with earlier studies in IR that have sought to make sense of the power
of non-state actors in global governance. Crucially, Keck and Sikkink (1998, 1999, 2014) applied the concept of the
norm entrepreneur to the actions of transnational advocacy networks. For them, it is connectedness across national
and international scales/actor-bridging networks that enables norm-driven global advocacy. Keck and Sikkink (1998,
4) argue that network thinking bridges an ‘increasingly artificial divide between international and national realms’.
However, the political realities of the 21st century have shown that ideas or norms do not travel that freely across
scales or spaces. At least since Brexit it is evident that global ideas and norms do not diffuse evenly or uniformly
across rural or urban spaces, even in countries as small as the United Kingdom. So, whilst ground-breaking at the time
of writing, the agency-centrism of the above-mentioned approaches do not fully capture the ways in which relations
in networks can both enable and constrain.Whilst networksmatter, there has perhaps been a tendency amongst both
governance actors and liberal constructivist scholars to conceptualize them as flat, non-hierarchical structures that
enable connection, but do not constrain it (Jones et al., 1997; for a critique see Sørensen & Torfing, 2016).
Evidently, whilst it is unhelpful to think of diaspora engagement strategies as entirely suppressing diaspora
agency in global politics, as some of the earlier cited accounts tend to do, an overemphasis on diaspora agency
equally obscures the complexity of what actually unfolds during such processes; top-down diasporamanagement and
bottom-up mobilization are often closely intertwined. As will become evident, transnational connectivity alone does
not guarantee that diaspora will be included in development governance or decision-making. In recent years, signifi-
cant theoretical advances have beenmade in the study of diasporamobilization. Scholars have begun to emphasise the
importance of thinking of thismobilization as ‘contextually embedded’. This is important, as it suggests amore nuanced
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understanding of diaspora agency and the opportunities and constraints to mobilization in different circumstances.
But there is variation in how contextual embeddedness is thought about.Whilst some scholars think of diasporamobi-
lization as embedded entirely within the hoststate (Kuschminder & Siegel, 2011, 2016), others highlight the interplay
of multiple hoststate contexts (Karabegović, 2017). Adamson and Koinova (2013) have written about how diaspora’s
embeddedness in (global) cities gives them power through access to networks and other forms of social, political,
and economic capital. Horst (2018) argues that civic engagement by Somalian diaspora youth is contingent upon
multi-sited embeddedness, whilst simultaneously also being a practice through which they create belonging (to a
multi-sited identity/community). In other words, mobilization is shaped by belonging to multiple places, and vice-
versa. The importance of contextual embeddedness in shaping diaspora power and capacity to mobilise is explored in
a recent 2018 JEMS special issue, with an empirical focus on spaces of contested sovereignty and conflict. The editors
compellingly argue that
(b)eyond considering diaspora agency as an actor in world politics, mainstream literatures need to be
further aware that diasporas are not free-floating individuals, groups, or networks, but are embedded
in contexts – local, national, supranational, and global – that shape their activism and are eventually
shaped by it.
This paper agrees with the above studies on the importance of thinking about contextual embeddedness for
diaspora mobilization, albeit with a different empirical focus on international development governance, rather than
conflict dynamics. Here, the contribution by Koinova (2017) is of particular importance. She deploys the concept of
‘socio-spatial positionality’ in her analysis of diasporapower andadvances the argument that,whetherdiaspora should
be considered an asset in post-conflict state building is dependent upon their linkages to different global contexts.
Rather than think of positionality only in terms of identity and social relations, socio-spatial positionality encompasses
also a spatial dimension of power. Diaspora power in global politics is thus shaped by (multiple) linkages to particular
places. Importantly, she theorises more precisely the nature of the context, namely as one characterized by different
but interrelated forms of power. This is important. What does such an understanding of diaspora power as ‘socio-
spatial positionality’ offer to the study of diaspora engagement strategies in development? It suggest that we need to
take seriously the situatedness of diaspora in different contexts; contexts in which social, and spatial forms of power
are entangled. In the next section, I will develop the analytical framework through which to better understand the
nature of diaspora inclusion in development, as well themethods used to generate and subsequently analyse the data.
A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES:
(DIS)ENTANGLING FORMS OF POWER
Conceptual discussion
One aim of this paper lies in questioning the assumption that diaspora engagement strategies in the field of devel-
opment can be explained by focusing either on top-down structural constraints or diaspora agency asserted from
the bottom-up. As discussed, most existing accounts of diaspora engagement strategies look at structural factors,
such as global governance norms, the global political economy, or geopolitics. This is somewhat presumptive, a priori
excluding the possibility for multiple forms of power to be in operation at any one time. It also risks reification of
state centrism and methodological nationalism. Meanwhile, relational theories make room for the notion that no one
form of power exists on its own; that diaspora can be both enabled and constrained in multiple ways in the context
of a diaspora engagement strategy. Building on such theorizing, I suggest that the politics of diaspora engagement
strategies are bound up in complex entanglements, e.g. of agency and structure, global and local, and so must be
gently and carefully untangled. For example, when a diaspora organization moves from being primarily focused on
attaining charitable status and hustling to get ‘a seat at the table’ of decision-making on development governance, to
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actively shaping the norms around diaspora engagement in development governance, the lines between governed and
governor become increasingly blurred. It is my intellectual ambition to be able to hold this sort of complexity, whilst
also advancing knowledge on diaspora engagement, more broadly.
How can we theorize about diaspora engagement in a way that takes full account of the complexity of relations
in which it is embedded? The next section will discuss the theories and conceptual building blocks that underlie my
research design, followed by the methods used to generate and subsequently analyse my data. This study adopts a
broadly relational approach, emphasising relative positionality, embeddedness and entanglements, over universals,
absolutes, or binaries. Importantly, I wish to foreground relational theories with a materialist dimension. After all,
diaspora engagement strategies, or diaspora governance is not just a virtual or ideational phenomenon, even if it is
exercised through networks. Specifically, this notion that networks are embedded in space/place, echoes some of the
recent forays of IR scholars into the studyofActor-Network-Theory. For example,Nexon andPouliot (2013, 344) point
out the false divide between ideational andmaterial forces, suggesting that ‘relations are simultaneously semiotic and
material’. The material embeddedness of Actor-Networks is of central importance to this paper. Further, in her 2017
study, Koinova draws on Bourdieu’s ‘field theory’ to theorise about socio-spatial diaspora power. For Bourdieu, ‘fields’
are arenas of production and circulation that are structured by hierarchical power relations. Specifically, he theorizes
the interrelated forms of power that structure these fields. Rather than focus purely on economic capital or material
power (as political economy approaches would have us do), fields are structured by social, cultural and economic cap-
ital (Boudieu, 1984). Thus, in this paper, I will use the term field in the Bourdieusian sense, to denote a hierarchically
structured arena (e.g. centered arounddevelopment) inwhich different formsof capital are simultaneously at play. But
I will not rely entirely on Bourdieu for my analysis of diaspora engagement strategies.Whilst a useful to concept think
from, in this empirical setting it is unlikely that we find a discrete ‘field’ (in the IR and in the Bourdieusian sense). Gov-
ernance will be more fractured, situated in multiple fields that often overlap (e.g. local, national, global). A relational
conceptwhich can help us think about how governance is fractured or situated in overlapping fields is the assemblage.
Assemblage thinking has recently become popular in IR as a way of making sense of the operation of power in inter-
national and global politics (Acuto & Curtis 2014). Assemblages are conceptualized as a system of relations between
human and non-human agents (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, 2014). Similarly, DeLanda (2016, 2) emphasises that
assemblages are characterised by two things: ‘that the parts that are fitted together are not uniform either in nature
or in origin, and that the assemblage actively links these parts together by establishing relations between them’. Dick-
inson (2017) has employed assemblage thinking in the analysis of diaspora engagement, albeit from a macro human
geography perspective. Unlike traditional network thinking, assemblages allow us to expand our analysis of relations
to include relations between agents that traditionally exist on different ontological planes (individuals, organisations,
states), or in overlapping fields of power, and also relations between these actors and their material environment.
For example, Dittmer’s (2017) work on Diplomatic Material has been ground-breaking for using assemblage theory to
understand the agencyofmaterial buildings, like theUKForeignOffice, or stacks of paper found insideoffice buildings,
in shaping global political processes.
Ultimately, what all of the above relational theories share is a concern for entanglements between different forms
of power, as well as a materialist dimension. Thinking through these theories with the empirical data from my case
study, I haveoperationalizeda relational analytical frame throughwhich I disentangle thedifferent formsofpower that
play a role in the politics of diaspora engagement. Specifically, I will showhowconnectivity, legitimacy, and spatiality all
work together to shape the nature of diaspora inclusion in development governance. Ultimately, this paper argues that
the inclusion of diaspora in development governance (such as consultation processes/capacity building) is conditioned
by entanglements and complex interrelationship of social networks, cultural fields, and thematerial environment.
Data collection and analysis
The argument brought forward in this paper builds primarily on data collected during fieldwork for my PhD,
from June–August 2016 and subsequently from January–June 2017 in Toronto, Canada. I chose Toronto as a site
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where I expected that the ‘global politics’ around Tamil diaspora engagement in development governance would be
revealed. By this I mean struggles that go beyond the diaspora-homeland relationship, for example around global
development norms, or, related to this, the geopolitical concerns of both diaspora host- and homeland. I draw con-
ceptual andmethodological inspiration from anthropologist Tsing (2011), who has pioneered the study of global-local
connections, andwhose work on Friction lends itself to the study of global-local entanglements.
I thus conducted multi-method fieldwork amongst members of the Tamil diaspora that were mobilizing towards
their homeland in various ways, as well as the practitioners and policy makers that were involved in governing this
mobilization. Centrally, I participated in and observed events during which I recorded ethnographic fieldnotes of dias-
pora transnational mobilization and governance in action. For example, within the first few days of arriving in the city
in the summer of 2016, I was invited to participate in the first meeting of the above mentioned DENG. I subsequently
attended 3 more of its in-person meetings from January to June 2017, became part of an email group where infor-
mation on diaspora and development was shared, as well as participated in two larger multi-stakeholder fora where
the DENGwas either discussed or its members were present. I also conducted (in English) over 40 open ended inter-
views with the diasporic and non-diasporic elites that I encountered in these spaces, and completed desk research, by
collecting and analysing secondary academic sources and a collection of policy documents, news articles, government
documents, and think tank reports on Tamil diaspora repression/governance and diaspora governance more broadly.
I recorded both my secondary, interview and ethnographic data in NVivo. I subsequently analysed my field data in
light of the literature on diaspora engagement and governance practices, iteratively establishing a relational analytical
framework around dimensions of connectivity, legitimacy, and spatiality, as discussed above.
I will now outline the emergence of Tamil mobilization for development and the governance of suchmobilization in
Toronto, before delving deeper into an analysis of the governance practices I encountered duringmy fieldwork.
CASE STUDY: ENGAGING TAMILS IN DEVELOPMENT IN TORONTO
A brief history of Tamils and development governance
This section will lay out some of the key historical conditions and junctures that have shaped Tamil mobilization for
development and havemade Tamil diaspora inclusion in practices of development governance, such as theDENG, pos-
sible. It begins by introducing us empirically to the phenomenon of diaspora inclusion in development governance.
Linking diaspora and development: From the United States to Canada
Whilst the connection drawn between migration and development was discussed throughout the 20th century, usu-
ally mirroring dominant political economic theories (de Haas, 2010), the specific linkage of development to diaspora
took off only in the early 2000s. Here, a driving force was the publication of a World Bank report on remittances,
which illuminated just how large a proportion of global financial transactions wasmade up bymoney sent bymigrants
to their countries of origin (Ratha et al., 2003). Word amongst DC’s policy-making community travelled fast and soon
the diaspora and development nexus was expanded beyond remittance sending (Newland & Patrick, 2004). In 2009,
USAID launched its Diaspora Network Alliance (DNA) ‘as a roadmap through which USAID resources can engage
with diaspora communities towards effective programming’.2 Enthralled by the idea of DNA, Hillary Clinton – then
Secretary of State – launched the International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA) in the State Department in
2011,3 to ‘(harness) the resources of diaspora communities to promote sustainable development and diplomacy in
their countries of heritage’.4
In Canada, federal interest in engaging diaspora communities was off to a slow start, despite the country’s high
immigrant density and significant remittance sending.5 Whilst, under StephenHarper’s conservative party leadership,
funding of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was cut,6 the Standing Committee on Foreign
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Affairs and International Development in 2012 began calling witnesses for a report on the role of the private sector
in international development.7 Invited were a number of experts from the US, who made a point to inform the
parliamentary committee about the importance of diaspora as private sector actors in the development field. Whilst
some MPs in the committee became interested in exploring this ‘diaspora option’ (Pellerin & Mullings, 2013), largely
because they themselves had large migrant constituencies, at the federal level interest largely fizzled out. Further, at
this time diaspora groups themselves seemed reluctant to be seen merely as remittance senders or money givers by
the Canadian state.8
At themunicipal level, things looked slightly different. Driven by the talks on diaspora and development in Ottawa,
in 2012 the Toronto-based peace-buildingNGO theMosaic Institute hosted an event in cooperationwithWashington
DC-based IdEA, titled Diasporas@Toronto. This event was also one of the earliest occasions that saw Toronto-based
Tamil diaspora organisations engaged in a wider inter-ethnic development network. But Tamil participation in this
eventwasmetwith disapproval, in particular by themore established Tamil diaspora community long engaged in polit-
ical activism (Amarasingham, 2015). The following section will explore why this was the case.
Tamils in Canada and their relationship with Sri Lanka
Of the approximately onemillion strong global Tamil diaspora, estimates suggest that up to 180,000 of those currently
reside in Canada,9 most in theGreater Toronto Area (GTA). Converging push and pull factors in the 1980smake it pos-
sible to account for the size of the Tamil community in Canada today. Almost in conjunction with the outbreak of civil
war in Sri Lanka in 1983, a number of political shifts occurred in Canada affecting also Canadian immigration policy.
As Amarasingham (2015, 78) has argued, ‘Tamil migrants (. . . ) benefited from the period of “turbulence” that marked
Canadian immigration and refugeedetermination in the1980s’.Of course, Canadawas also a preferreddestination for
Tamils based on their familiarity with the English language. Despite a large proportion of Tamils settling in Canada as
political refugees in the late1980s andearly 1990s, today theTamil diaspora inCanada is veryheterogeneous, in terms
of immigrant generation, religion, caste, and class (Gunasingam, 2014; for discussions of the relevance of caste in the
Tamil diaspora see Paramsothy, 2018; Troulliet, 2020). Perhaps the most central cleavage amongst diaspora Tamils in
Toronto, but also globally, is found in their position towardshomelandpolitics.While, it is difficult do justice to the com-
plexity that characterises the relations of the Tamil diaspora with their homeland, both during the conflict and after, I
will highlight a number of dynamics that have conditioned the engagement of the Toronto-based Tamil community in
development governance today.
The engagement of the Tamil diaspora community in homeland politics (including development governance) has
overwhelmingly been regarded as contentious. Primarily, this is because the Tamil diaspora, particularly those residing
in the UK and Canada, were viewed as ‘peace-wreckers’ or spoilers during the civil war (Baser & Swain, 2008; Eich-
horst, 2007; Newman & Richmond, 2006; Zunzer, 2004). There is evidence to suggest that the diaspora was the main
financial source of the insurgent group fighting the Sri Lankan state government for national self-determination, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Some liberal advocacy organisations have highlighted that many of the finan-
cial contributions to the LTTE’s war-effort were violently extorted from the Tamil diaspora community (Becker 2006).
However, this does not negate the fact that diaspora Tamils were also voluntarily sending large amounts of money to
their families and relatives, to ensure their survival and also to further the Tamil struggle back home. Whatever the
‘true’ reason behind the high number of remittances reaching the LTTE-controlled areas during the Sri Lankan civil
war, it made the Sri Lankan state government, as well as the majority Singhalese population on the island extremely
suspicious, nay fearful, of the Tamil diaspora overall. This suspicion continues to this day.10 Thus, one reason for the
dearth of Tamil diaspora inclusion in development governance is that ‘the government (has viewed) the diaspora pri-
marily through the lens of security, and not development’ (Amasingam&Poologaindran, 2016).
But suspicion swings two ways. Throughout my research amongst the Tamil diaspora community in Toronto,
inquiries about engagement in development were met with bewilderment. Indeed, the concept of ‘development’ was
firmly associated with repressive activities that the government had been pursuing in the North and East of the island
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since the defeat of the LTTE. ‘Development’ was essentially understood by Tamils in the diaspora to signify Singhalese
military occupation and land grabbing, for example, itwas the ‘Presidential Task Force for Resettlement,Development,
and Security in the Northern Province’ which took over the governance of majority Tamil areas after the war (Guriybe
& Tharmalingam, 2017, 182). Finally, a large proportion of the Tamil diaspora in Toronto today views engagement in
development as a distraction from more pressing areas of Tamil post-war diaspora mobilization, such as lobbying for
accountability and human rights at the UN or with the Canadian government.
Certainly, the endof thewar in 2009must be considered awindowof opportunity for Tamil diaspora engagement in
homeland development. Not only did the extremely violent fighting in theNorth and East of Sri Lanka, killing countless
Tamil civilians, lead to an increase in the perceived need for external humanitarian and development assistance. 2009
also presented an important turning point for international geopolitical engagement with the Sri Lankan state, and
by extension the Tamil diaspora community (Brun et al., 2012; Guyot, 2018). As evidence of war crimes committed
by the GOSL against Tamil civilians began to mount, international perception of the Tamil diaspora also began to shift.
Whilst inCanada, and inToronto inparticular, Tamils hadmadeheadlines through their involvement in gangviolence,11
and subsequently as terrorist-sympathisers, in 2009 they were able to garner the support of the federal government
(Godwin, 2018). An important milestone for this was the Tamil occupation of the Gardiner Expressway in downtown
Toronto (Jeyapal, 2013). In early2009, during themost violent fightingof theentire civilwar, a hugeprotestwas staged
outside of theOntario provincial government building, later spilling on to one of themajor traffic arteries of the city.12
Whilst some criticized the event for portraying the Tamil diaspora as a nuisance and assign it no political importance, it
is used bymany Tamils to signal a shift in diasporic consciousness. For example, the 2009 events awakenedmany Tamil
youth to the plight of their ethnic kin in the homeland, which many of them had never stepped foot on, thus leading to
a renewed interest in seeking relations with their ‘homeland’.13 On the other hand, it certainly affected perceptions of
the Tamil diaspora held by fellowCanadians, who first considered the disruptions a nuisance (Krishnamurti 2013), but
gradually becamemore receptive toward Tamil ethnic grievances (Bradimore & Bauder, 2012; Jeyapal, 2014).14 After
2009, Tamil diaspora attention, also that of younger generations, broadly began to focus on the international level,
specifically theUNHumanRightsCouncil (UNHRC),where claims to transitional justice and accountabilitywere being
negotiated. In many ways, the post-war period saw the relationship between the Tamil diaspora and the Sri Lankan
state strained evenmore.
During this time theopportunities for formal Tamil diaspora involvement indevelopment governancewereminimal,
and there were no Sri Lankan state-led efforts to harness Tamil diaspora contributions to development governance.
Similarly, in the early years after the end of the war the topic of ‘development’ was barely raised amongst Tamils in
Toronto, at least not publicly or in a formalisedmanner.
2015: The stars align for Tamil diaspora inclusion
The year 2015 presented another importantmilestone for Toronto-based Tamil diaspora organisations working in the
development field. A number of globally interconnected events occurred that set the scene for the inclusion of Tamil
diaspora in relevant development governance networks and spaces.
On the one hand, in Sri Lanka the election of Maithripala Sirisena to the office of president, in a surprise defeat of
incumbentMahinda Rajapaksa, stirred hope amongst factions of the Tamil diaspora that progress towards justice was
on the horizon.Whilst Rajapaksa’s reignwas defined largely by his Singhalese chauvinism, corruption, and violent dec-
imation of the Tamil population during the final stage of the civil war,15 Sirisena ran on a platform of ‘good governance’
and promises to ensure accountability for Tamil victims. The election outcome also briefly made it safer for Tamil dias-
pora members to physically travel to Sri Lanka. Ultimately, a window of opportunity for diaspora Tamils to engage in
development governance in their homelandopenedup.Meanwhile, Canada also held elections in 2015. Replacing con-
servative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the election of Justin Trudeau, leader of the liberal party, signalled a move
towards economically liberal, socially progressive, and amore internationally orientedCanadian politics. Further, both
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national elections coincided with the official launch of the UN SDGs. A central innovation from theMillenniumDevel-
opmentGoals (MDGs)was their insistence that developmentwas not just the responsibility of the global South; rather
it concerned everybody. Developed countries in the global Northwere now equally responsible for the SDGs’ success,
for example in the fight against climate change, and the eradication of world poverty. This argumentation rests on a
global systems approach which sees the world as integrated; any efforts to affect change must thus be holistic and
sensitive to this global interconnectedness (Zhang, Prouty, Zimmerman, & Mihelcic, 2016). Articulated in this man-
ner, the SDGs quickly found resonance amongst Canadian development professionals, and the newly minted ministry
of ‘Global Affairs Canada’ wholeheartedly embraced the new international development agenda. Whilst remaining a
national body, the renaming of the ministry indicated what Tsing (2011, 57) has referred to as ‘scale-making projects’,
implying that the mere invocation of a global scale can indicate a profound shift in meaning. However, the ‘global’-
positioning of the ministry responsible for development governance did not translate to a larger budget to back up
this position federally. This became evident in 2017, during the release of the new budget for the Canadian Feminist
International Assistance Policy. Indeed, lack of additional funding provided for the implementation of the highly ambi-
tious SDGs placed additional pressure on civil society organisations working in the development sector.16
Meanwhile, immediately before the federal elections in 2015, the then-DFATD, had tasked the OCIC with hold-
ing a consultation on the engagement of ‘cultural communities for sustainable development’.17 Even though the term
‘diaspora’ was avoided in the title, in my discussions with participants and organisers it became clear that the con-
sultations were largely borne from the 2012 report on the role of non-state actors in international development by
the Standing Committee of FAAE.18 Whilst the OCIC was put in charge of organising the event, they turned to the
Mosaic Institute for support, explicitly for their expertise on all things diaspora, implicitly for their extensive network
of organisations (specifically in the field of diaspora and peace-building, see above). The consultation gathered a num-
ber of academic experts on diaspora and civil society organisations, like WUSC and Cuso International, both with a
long history of running diaspora volunteering programmes in the global South. As suggested in the vignette, this event
would turn out to be highly significant for the emergence of a Toronto-centered group of organisations and individu-
als focused on engaging diaspora in development. Indeed, it was here that the idea for the Toronto-based DENG was
conceived. Importantly, the executive director of the Mosaic Institute had extended invitations to a select number of
recently formed Tamil diaspora-run development and peacebuilding organisations. This was a significant step towards
the inclusion of Tamil diaspora in development governance. For the invited Tamil organisations, the 2015 consulta-
tions provided a significant opportunity to broaden their organisational networks and consolidate their relationship
with theOCIC, and the broader Canadian (and global) development community.
What becomes evident in these preceding paragraphs is that the emergence of strategies to engage diaspora in
development governance was not linear, and far from resembled a national roll-out or international downward dif-
fusion of policy. Rather, it was characterised by contingency, and the formation of unlikely alliances, sometimes out
of chance, often out of convenience. The story told here encompasses entanglements between organisations, spaces,
ideas, andagents that a state-centric accountof diaspora engagement indevelopment governancewould entirelymiss.
But acknowledging the existence of complexity, contingency, and chance is only the first step towards a better under-
standing of the politics of diaspora inclusion in development. I will now disentangle the conditions that make possible
this seemingly chaotic engagement. Specifically, I will show how diaspora inclusion in development governance, has
been conditioned by social connectivity, legitimacy claims, and spatial embeddedness.
Disentangling conditions for diaspora inclusion in development governance
‘Keeping the connection alive’: Fostering social connectivity and networks of
communication
The Diaspora Engagement Networking Group, described in the introductory vignette, presents an example of a dias-
pora engagement strategy that seeks to foster diaspora inclusion in development governance. As mentioned, the
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DENG was founded on the back of another diaspora engagement strategy, an event titled ‘Cultural Communities for
Sustainable Development Consultations’, which took place in the spring of 2015. In the lead up to its International
Assistance Review, DFATD had made the top-down decision that the OCIC should organize these consultations as a
matter of urgency. Indeed, I learned from interviewswith the organisers that the consultationswere planned very last
minute, leaving little room for a well-thought out strategy on whom to invite or engage in the consultations. Conse-
quently, existing networks were leveraged. The OCIC and Cuso International already shared an office in the Centre
for Social Innovation, which meant that Cuso was a shoe-in for the consultation event. In fact, much of OCIC’s focus
on diaspora had emerged from close cooperation with Cuso International and its diaspora partner organisations. But
the ad hoc creation of guest lists was not unique to this particular event. Other evidence found in my data suggests
that decisions to include or engage diaspora in development governance or peacebuilding followed a similar pattern.
Below is a response from the Mosaic Institute’s executive director to the question of how the decision was made on
whom to invite to an engagement event held in 2012, titled Diasporas@Toronto:
Mosaic has an amazing network. (. . . ) Mosaic is about people. We were the only game in town that did
not have a connection to a specific diaspora community, which meant that we were in a position to
partner with a lot of ethno-specific organisations, as well as with non-ethno-specific orgs, academic,
business.We knew a lot of people. And I thinkwe generated the list through our own networks, andwe
also had a significant in-kind contribution from my former employer, which was the Ontario Ministry
of Economic Development and Trade. They loaned us the Ontario Investment and Trade Center – of
which I had been the inaugural director – which is a beautiful international trade presentation centre
on Yonge Street (. . . ) so I think it might have been a bit quid pro quo in that they provided a lot of names
to investors as well. Which was great because they wanted to be seen as actively engaged in diaspora
communities and conversations about business networks. So that worked for them. The peacebuilding
part worked for us, the development pieceworked for us, and for Cuso International, and for IdEA. And
IdEAwas able to say “look,wehave this partner event happening inToronto that extends the region, the
footprint of IdEA, but is organised through a particular Canadian lens” and . . . everyone was happy.19
This excerpt confirms that the decision-making process aroundwhom to include in the event is based, in large part,
on existing social networks and communication channels. My data suggest that because of the ad hoc nature of many
such events, a crucial dimensionof diaspora inclusion in government-led consultations or civil society capacity building
events iswhetherornot anorganisationor individual has a strongnetwork.Accordingly, a largeproportionof practices
within the development field are directed towards the creation and maintenance of social relations. The founding of
the DENG can then be explained as a response to this demand/need for social connections and does indeed foster the
inclusion of diaspora in decision-making around development governance. This also has an impact on the importance
ascribed by diasporamembers to their own networking practices. I asked one ofmy Tamil interlocutors howhe and his
organization became part of the DENG and how he established a relationship with theOCICmore generally:
Oh, in a very round-aboutway. (. . . ) I met a gentleman (. . . ) whowaswith theMosaic Institute. (He) knew
of what I was trying to do with (the organisation), and he was very happy to see that kind of thing. And
so, he asked the OCIC to invite me to be a participant in the round table that they had in 2015. And
since then we kind of kept that connection alive. So, I sometimes exchange emails with the Executive
Director at the OCIC and we just kind of stayed close to OCIC. And then they had this Global Citizen-
shipweek andwe participated and I think our posterwon second place in the competition. So, all of this
was great. But I think I want to get more involved. So, this is why we decided a couple a months ago to
actually apply formembership at theOCIC. And get access to the resources, but also get access to the
policy formulating tables that OCIC has in Ottawa.
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In this excerpt, he mentions the importance of repetition in maintaining social connections (‘We kind of kept that
connection alive’, ‘I sometimes exchange emails . . . and so we kind of stayed close’), but he also emphasises the impor-
tanceofmore formal relations to create andmaintain access to resources and ‘thepolicymaking tables’wheredecision
around international development governance were beingmade.
But my data suggests that even beyond the development field diaspora actors need to spend a large proportion
of their time and energy building social capital. This is illustrated in excerpts from an interview with the national
spokesperson of the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC). It was his response to my question on how the CTC began its
operations in Canada in themid to late 2010s.
(. . . ) we atCTC,webelieve in engagement. Andengagementwill alwayswork. Initially, sometimes peo-
ple don’t engagewith you, but they don’t know you.When you go through people –when you get closer
to them – it’s all the same. We are the same, you and me. We may have different colours, maybe we
speak different languages. But, fundamentally, people are the same. Humans are the same (. . . ) the only
thing is: you have to get to know them. We believe in that very firmly. Unless you get to know some-
body, you cannot pass on remarks to them. So, we went and we sat with those people and started
explaining to them. And they got to know us.
(. . . ) Locally we met with MPs and nationally we met with leaders of the parties. We went to their con-
ventions, we met with their delegates and met with ministers, you name it. And when we go to parlia-
ment, we make it a point of meeting all different parties and leaders of the parties, at least the person
who has some say in the party.
Here he describes some of the struggles that the organisation experienced after its inception, and the strategies
that were used in trying to establish itself in the Canadian public sphere as ‘The Voice of Tamil Canadians’. What
emerges from the excerpt is that my interlocutor is convinced that CTC’s success is ultimately linked to ‘engagement’,
and that ‘engagementwill alwayswork’. Butwhat exactly does ‘engagement’mean in this context?He seems to employ
the term to describe a range of practices, from reaching out to journalists formedia coverage, meetingwith politicians
to communicate concerns and issues affecting the Tamil community, to attending events and seeking out opportunities
for face-to-face interactions with public representatives and decision-makers. He also emphasises the importance of
persistence and repetition in these practices (‘But I didn’t go down’, ‘It was a learning curve for us’). Ultimately, both
examples illustrate the importance placed by diaspora organisations on deepening and expanding the reach of their
(professional) networks. Based onwhatweknowabout howorganisations likeOCICandMosaicmakedecisions about
who to include in development events and consultations, the prioritisation by diasporic actors of social connections
and networks seemswarranted.
Evidently, we need to take networks seriously in the study of diaspora inclusion in development governance. That
networks are of central importance for diaspora is a popular policy perspective (Kuznetsov, 2006). It suggests that
the creation of networks and virtual communicational channels is the key to eradicating barriers to inclusion. Gover-
nance actors, like the OCIC or the Canadian government, have identified access to networks as a barrier to effective
diaspora contributions to development. Thus, opportunities for networking are increasingly provided in the form of
consultations, events, networking groups, lobbying. The proliferation of shared workspaces, networking groups and
events (such as the DENG) and virtual communication tools that foster networking are considered the key to achiev-
ing inclusion in development governance. But also in academia has the power of diaspora in IR often been associated
with their uniquepositionwithin transnational social (Wayland, 2004) and financial networks (Elo&Minto-Coy, 2018).
Diaspora have been conceptualized as brokers or norm entrepreneurs with an ‘in-between advantage’ (Brinkerhoff,
2016) allowing them to act as norm entrepreneurs. But we cannot reduce diaspora power to social capital, or network
relations. Connectivity to networks and channels of communication on its own does not guarantee diaspora’s power
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and inclusion in global politics. More needs to be known about the context of these social connections, their cultural
as well as material embeddedness.
Becoming legitimate partners in development governance
The above paragraphs suggest that a condition for diaspora inclusion in government-led consultations or civil society
capacity building events in the development field is a diaspora’s position in a social network. But whilst it might seem
that themostwell-networkeddiaspora groupwill automatically be themost powerful ormost included, these network
connections do not exist in a vacuum. In fact, I will argue that the majority of Tamil-run diaspora groups are excluded
fromdevelopment governance networks based on a lack of legitimacy. How this lackmanifests will be explored below.
When asked about Tamil mobilization for development, one of my interlocutors laments the mobilization practices
of his fellow Tamil-Canadians:
one time I remember going to a meeting, where (. . . ) a lot of money was raised and it was given to
an organisation in the North (of Sri Lanka) where they brought a hundred sewing machines and gave
those to women. And I pretty much yelled at that meeting, saying: “Why couldn’t we invest that money
in sending these women to like computer classes or programming classes? Why are we reinforcing
gender-stereotypes?’ And the thing is, the women who have sewing machines already are producing,
but they don’t know how to market that and sell it. So, it is a different skill that they actually (need) –
not the sewing machine. They actually need somebody to tell them how to do business planning and
marketing. So, that is the kind of nuanced approach to development that is really missing”.
He continues by saying that:
in the development spacewhat you find increasingly now, is (Tamil) organisations that have historically
done political work, getting into that space as well. So, development is in many ways being coopted
for a political agenda, I would argue. So, these organisations then bring those substantial organising
and resource mobilization capabilities to development work. Except they are not doing development
as we understand it, they are doing development as they understand. Not based on any Sustainable
Development principles. Not based on understanding the existing social inequities in SL. They are just
doing it like “let’s hold a party, raise money and give back”.
He suggests that Tamil diaspora mobilization for development has historically taken the form ‘giving money and
not asking questions’. In a long interview, he very eloquently points out a range of problems that plague the ‘remit-
tance economy’, as he calls it, which has been set up between the Tamil diaspora and its homeland. In the interview,
he also suggests that diaspora mobilizing for development needs to be committed to the UN’s Agenda for Sustainable
Development, specifically their commitment to gender equality. This is a discourse that resonates with the conver-
sations I observe during DENGmeetings. Here members often made a point of highlighting their commitment to the
UN’s Agenda 2030, sometimes criticizing their fellowdiasporamembers for lack of accountability and ineffectiveness.
Their concerns echo the above interview, and what has recently become the orthodox understanding in the develop-
ment field: that diaspora remittances need to be managed in order to be effective. In mobilizing for development, the
expressed willingness to move ‘beyond remittances’ (Newland & Patrick, 2004) towards capacity building and knowl-
edge and skills transfer is considered central for diaspora legitimacy.
Beyond discourses that directly pertain to the ‘how’ of diaspora mobilization, at the time of my research the field
of development governance is also structured around broader norms surrounding the concept of good governance
and sustainability. In order for diasporic actors to be included in development governance or decision-making, they
must signal their commitment to these ideas. This is what makes them legitimate ‘partners’. Importantly, as Horst and
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Sinatti (2015) have suggested, in this way diaspora engagement strategies also function as a way of propagating dom-
inantWestern development norms. Further, the possession of local knowledge (of culture and language), and a sense
of purpose and belonging are considered desirable traits in diasporic development actors. Horst and Sinatti (2015)
have insightfully explored how diaspora are considered ‘good’ development actors as they purport to have a link to
the homeland and local knowledge and can therefore ‘represent’ local populations in places where development pro-
grammes are being implemented. Meanwhile, diaspora organisations, in order to be considered legitimate, must also
have technical (objective) knowledge on development practice so that they canwork effectively. These discourses are
often at odds with each other, making legitimacy relations hard to navigate. The ‘networking group’ is then evidently
not just a place for making social connections. It is also a space that is hierarchically structured by dominant ideas and
norms about what correct development is and how diaspora should engage in it.
Another argument that I advance in this section is that diaspora engagement in development is not only embedded
in ‘global’ cultural fields like that of international development. Here the concept of the assemblage becomes useful,
as it allows us to think about how agents are able to simultaneously embed in multiple fields. Situations where agents
seem to move between different overlapping fields, suggests a flattening of scales. Naturally, a study of inclusion of
diaspora in (global) development governancemust be preoccupiedwith exploring the internal working of the develop-
ment field, in order to understand diaspora access to and agency within this field. However, the reality for most dias-
poric actors is that they enter these ‘global’ fields only very infrequently. In a way, the ‘global’ cultural field only exists
in the encounters and events that include global governance representatives, e.g. from the UN or World Bank. Tamil
diaspora actors are more often concerned with their relations to their new country of residence, as illustrated in the
section on networks. Diaspora organisations want to appear legitimate to the broader Canadian population and state
actors. Hence, they must position themselves in a national cultural field. We know from the literature on integration
that migrants are constantly negotiating their new home environment. Here, the idea of the ‘model migrant’ becomes
central, especially for diaspora residing in liberal Western countries like Canada. Success is measured as educational
attainment against structural odds, integration into mainstream culture, or the upholding of values of respectability,
as explored in the literature on migrant cultural capital (Erel, 2010). Indeed, I found that the position of a diaspora
group or individual within the Canadian national cultural field is shaped by their performance of Canadian citizenship,
i.e. upholding Canadian values of multiculturalism, feminism and diversity, practicing aboriginal solidarity, performing
‘hyphenated Canadian’ identity.
But for the Tamil diaspora in Toronto, performing as a model migrant also means positioning themselves in rela-
tion to a number of fairly contentious political debates and practices. Here the issue of representation is of particular
importance. Positioning in the Tamil nationalist struggle largely determines whether Tamils view an organisation as
representative or not. This is actually where a lot of the development-oriented organisations seem to falter. A dias-
pora organisation may be so plugged in to the SDG debate and Canadian national politics that they are no longer con-
sidered legitimate ‘representatives’ of the Tamil diaspora or the local Tamils in Sri Lanka. Their legitimacy within the
development field is traded in for legitimacy in the eyes of their Tamil-Canadian constituents, and vice versa.
Finally, the nascent Tamil diaspora organisation I encountered at the DENG also wanted to appear legitimate in
the eyes of young (second or third) generation Tamils. These make up a large faction of the Toronto-based diaspora
and form the core pool of applicants for their development volunteering programmes. Here, affirmations of tech-
nical capacity are less important. Rather, in order to appear legitimate and representative to these young people –
many of whom are highly educated and hard-working young professionals – the organisation has adopted discourses
and practices that display what Savage et al. (2018) describe as emerging cultural capital. Emerging (urban) cultural
fields are structured around educational attainment, emphasis on youth engagement, usage of youth jargon and ‘mil-
lenialisms’, highlighting innovation and ‘newness’, referencing popular culture, emphasizing reflexivity and spirituality
(Savage et al., 2018). In Toronto this entails, for example, quoting Drake lyrics in social media communications. These
practices become particularly important when diaspora organisations seek to enlist youth volunteers for their devel-
opment programmes or as they compete for municipal funds to implement projects that foster Toronto’s involvement
in strengthening the SDGs.
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Evidently, to be considered legitimate diasporamust often position themselveswithinmultiple overlapping cultural
fields simultaneously. Thosewho fail to do this, struggle to gain legitimacy in the eyes of powerful development gover-
nance actors. In fact, some of the longest existing Tamil diaspora organisations, with themost extensive networks and
links to all major political party leaderships, as well as the most widespread membership amongst the Toronto Tamil
diaspora community, struggle to have their voice heard in global development governance fora. This is because they
may have political power in the more traditional sense, as they influence federal MPs through electoral politics. How-
ever, they fare less strongly in terms of both development-related and emerging cultural capital. Finally, for diaspora
individuals and organisations to exist in multiple fields at the same time, networks are important. Social connections
allow diaspora to travel between different fields, proving again the importance of entanglements between different
power relations.
In sum, we have now discussed two conditions that shape the ways in which diaspora are included in development
governance/decision-making: The social relations between actors and the relations of these actors within overlapping
fields. These two are themselves interconnected in the sense that no single actor would find themselves occupying
cultural fields at different scales (global, national and local) if it was not for their networking capacity.What is missing
is an understanding of a third power dimension that shapes diaspora inclusion in development governance; that of
spatiality.20
Reterritorializing diaspora inclusion in development governance
Ultimately, even if a Tamil diaspora organisation positions itself as a legitimate development actor and enters into
social connections with powerful development actors in charge of diaspora engagement strategies, barriers to inclu-
sion remain. This is because connectivity and legitimacy are also always spatially anchored. Consider the Robertson
Building at 215 Spadina Avenue in downtown Toronto. On its website we can read that: ‘the building is home to a clus-
ter of community businesses, social entrepreneurs, and non-profit organizations, as well as a bio-wall (a completely
living-breathing wall made of plants), and extensive green roof, greenhouse and cedar viewing deck’.21 Approximately
30 percent of my fieldwork in Toronto took place in or in close proximity to this building located in the middle of
Toronto’s Chinatown. In fact, the site of the first DENG meeting described in the opening vignette, forms part of the
same estate and sits right across the street. The restored warehouse with a history of manufacturing of plumbing fix-
tures and fittings, today contains the offices of the OCIC, Cuso International and the CSI, and thus forms a crucial
component of the context in which diaspora engagement strategies are embedded.
The Robertson Building has agency as a symbolic and a social space. Is it a ‘hub’ where people canmingle andwhere
organisations share office space and create and build networks. As mentioned above, OCIC and Cuso International
have built much of their collaboration around sharing a large open plan office. The building also holds symbolic power.
Henri Lefebvre (1991) has famously written about how spaces can be appropriated, reappropriated and disappro-
priated, shaping their role in urban politics. We can think about the Robertson Building as having been reappropri-
ated from its original function as an industrial factory, buzzing with migrant labourers, to a hub for social enterprises
employing urbanmiddle-classworkers competing for capital in the knowledge economy. Importantly, and in contradic-
tion to its original purpose, it now symbolically excludes members of the migrant working class in Toronto, who often
lack the symbolic or cultural capital to legitimize their existence in these spaces. These two spatial-dimensions (sym-
bolic and social) are captured by the socio-spatial positionality concept explored by Koinova (2019). They both affect
who is included in development governance.
But the Robertson Building also has power as amaterial space.Who gets to enter the building is not just aboutwho
has the cultural capital to do so. The building occupies a particular territory in downtown Toronto and is embedded
in the city’s public infrastructure. Adler-Nissen (2012) has suggested that we must thus study the interplay between
symbolic and material resources in International Politics. So how do material resources affect a diaspora inclusion in
development governance? Whenever I attended an event that was hosted by Tamil diaspora, I had to plan for about
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1.5 h on public transit, driving through what seemed like endless parking lots (or what Keil (2020) refers to as ‘post-
fordist ruins’). Meanwhile, the sites of diaspora engagement for development, like the Robertson Building and the CSI
are located in downtown Toronto, and not in Scarborough or North York – where the largest proportion of Tamils
reside and most diaspora organisations have their offices. The representative from the Tamil organisation that was
part of the DENG mentioned to me on occasion that they would like to be more closely linked to the CSI through
obtaining actual office space there. Diaspora inclusion in development governance is evidently dependent on geog-
raphy and economic capital needed to gain geographical proximity to sites of power. Material resources determine
where diaspora organisations can afford to rent office space. In combination with geographical distance, it also deter-
mines whether they have time andmoney to travel to regularly attend networking events. During my time in Toronto,
each time aDENGmeeting was scheduled, there were somemembers who could not attend based on their geograph-
ical positionwithin Toronto.Members sought to overcome this spatial barrier throughmeasures like teleconferencing
and occasionally meeting in other locations across the GTA. But this was considered second best. Members of Cuso
International and OCIC could always meet up in person more spontaneously than others, consolidating already exist-
ing hierarchies within the network.
Evidently then, diaspora engagement in development governance does not float freely. Who is included is as much
a question of who is connected, and who is seen as legitimate, as it is who has physical access to the sites of engage-
ment. In sum, if a Tamil diaspora member says and does all the right things and shows up on the radar of the devel-
opment governance network, barriers to inclusion – and especially sustained engagement – remain. This is because
social relations, and legitimacy claims are also always spatially anchored.What the above paragraphs show is the close
entanglement of conditions for inclusion of diaspora in development governance.
CONCLUSION AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The preceding paragraphs have offered original ethnographic data on diaspora engagement strategies from which
were disentangled a range of power relations, namely social connectivity, legitimacy claims, and spatial embedded-
ness that determine the conditions for inclusion of diaspora in development governance. The paper began by arguing
that the founding of the DENG networking group makes fairly obvious the importance of ‘networks’ to the inclusion
of diaspora in development governance. Meanwhile, evidence revealed that the ‘networking group’ is not just a place
for making social connections. It is also a place that is hierarchically structured by dominant ideas and norms about
what correct development is and how diaspora should engage in it. It also offers insights into dominant ideas about
Canadian identity. Empirically, the paper showed that within the international development field, there has emerged a
dominant discourse of how diaspora should engage in development. Diaspora inclusion in development governance is
conditioned by a diaspora actors’ ability to establish themselves as a legitimate partner for development governance.
Finally, the data also revealed the importanceof space (symbolic, social andmaterial) in structuring access to and inclu-
sion in development governance. In conclusion, whilst social connectivity is important, networks of diaspora engage-
ment donot float freely. They are embedded in global and local cultural fields,which in turn are embedded in amaterial
environment. A relational ontology has also allowedme to investigate and account for contingency and scale jumping.
The spaces inwhich development governance actors come together to ‘engage diaspora’may allow for chance interac-
tions between agents that would usually occupy different fields at overlapping scales . In this way, they can transport
ideas from the local to the global scale and back again. Thus, a fairly small and unknown local diaspora organisation
with good connections might gain access to people in positions of global power, thus bolstering their legitimacy.
What this paper was not able to address in detail is the role that professionalization and bureaucratic power play
in the politics of diaspora engagement. After all, an important means by which diaspora organisations gain legitimacy
and are thus more likely to gain access to spaces of governance/decision-making, is through proving themselves to
be effective professional actors in the development field. For diaspora organisations, this means spending a large
proportion of their resources jumping through bureaucratic hoops. But legitimacy gained through professionalization
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can then sometimes also stand in the way of effectiveness. Evidence from my interviews with members of the DENG
suggests that diaspora organisations are often preoccupied with reaching charity status, becoming formal members
of the OCIC umbrella group, obtaining operational capacity. An interesting avenue for future research would be to
ask: How does bureaucracy shape diaspora inclusion in development governance? This echoes work done by Pouliot
and Thérien (2018) on accreditation practices, and Eagleton-Pierce (2018, 2020) on professionalization of NGOs
at the WTO. Future research on the embeddedness of diaspora engagement strategies will also need to address in
more detail questions such as: How do actors navigate the constraints that they face? How might they change their
position? What forms of power allow them to do so? This requires delving deeper into the interplay of agents and
the different types of structuring relations within specific contexts beyond the origin-state, but also beyond the field
of development. This paper then offers a jumping off point to the study of phenomena – like diaspora engagement
strategies in development governance – that do not fit into traditionally modernist and state-centric analytical




1 Amore thorough discussion of the Bourdieusian concept of the field can be found on page 7.
2 https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1880/DNA_Framework_(revAug2013).pdf
3 Interviewwith Kathleen Newland, spring 2018.
4 https://www.state.gov/s/partnerships/diaspora/
5 https://mowatcentre.ca/canada-is-now-a-diaspora-nation/
6 CIDA is later subsumedby theDepartmentof ForeignAffairs andTradeandDevelopment,which in2015 is renamedGlobal
Affairs Canada.
7 http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-1/FAAE/report-6/
8 Interviewwith Tamil diasporamember, summer 2016.
9 Gunasingam 2014: 76.
10 So much so that many civil society groups who are trying to foster diaspora engagement in Sri Lanka today are refraining
from using the diaspora term; seeMohamed-Saleem 2016.
11 Freeze (2001), Bullets Fly asTamilGangWarFlares, available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/bullets-
fly-as-tamil-gang-war-flares/article25437485/
12 Tamil Protest Moves off Gardiner to Queens Park, available at https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2009/05/10/tamil_
protest_moves_off_gardiner_to_queens_park.html
13 Interviewwith Tamil activist, Toronto, summer 2016.
14 Interviewwith diaspora scholar in Toronto, summer 2016.
15 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-sri-lanka-mahinda-rajapaksa
16 Interviewwith NGO representative, Toronto, spring 2017.
17 Ontario Council for International, Cultural Communities for Sustainable Development Consultations, available at http://
www.ocic.on.ca/what-we-do/influence-and-inspire/cultural-communities-for-sustainable-development-consultation/
18 http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-1/FAAE/report-6/




Abrahamsen, R., &Williams,M. (2014). Tracing global assemblages, bringingBourdieu to the field. InM.A. Relations&S. Curtis
(Eds.), Reassembling international theory: Assemblage thinking and international relation (pp. 25–31). PalgraveMacmillan.
Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. C. (2009). Security beyond the state: Global security assemblages in international politics.
International Political Sociology, 3(1), 1–17.
Acuto, M., & Curtis, S. (2014). Assemblage thinking and international relations. Reassembling International Theory (pp. 1–15).
Palgrave Pivot.
NETWORKSDONOT FLOAT FREELY 19
Adamson, F. (2002). International democracy assistance inUzbekistan andKyrgyzstan: Building civil society from the outside?
In S. Mendelson & J. Glenn (Eds.), The power and limits of NGOs: A critical look at building democracy in eastern Europe and
Eurasia (pp. 177–206). Columbia University Press.
Adamson, F. B. (2013).Mechanisms of diasporamobilization and the transnationalization of civil war. Transnational dynamics of
civil war, (pp. 63–88). Cambridge University Press.
Adamson, F. B. (2016). Spaces of global security: Beyond methodological nationalism. Journal of Global Security Studies, 1(1),
19–35.
Adamson, F. B., & Koinova, M. (2013). The global city as a space for transnational identity politics. SOAS Working Paper. SOAS,
London, England.
Adler-Nissen, R. (2012). Why international relations theory needs Bourdieu. e-International Relations. Retrieved from https:
//www.e-ir.info/2012/10/23/why-international-relations-theory-needs-bourdieu/
Amarasingam, A. (2015). Pain, pride and politics: Sri Lankan Tamil activism in Canada. University of Georgia Press.
Amarasingam, A., & Poologaindran, A. (2016). Diaspora, development, and intra-community politics: Sri Lankan Tamils in
Canada and post-war debates. In A. Chikanda, J. Crush, &M.Walton-Roberts (Eds.).Diasporas, development and governance
(pp. 49–63). Springer.
Bakewell, O. (2009). Migration, diasporas and development: Some critical perspectives. Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie &
Statistik 229(6), 787–802.
Basch, L., Schiller, N. G., & Blanc, C. S. (2005). Nations unbound: Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritori-
alized nation-states. Routledge.
Baser, B., & Swain, A. (2008). Diasporas as peacemakers: Third party mediation in homeland conflicts. International Journal on
World Peace, 25, 7–28.
Becker, J. (2006). Funding the “final war”: LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil diaspora.Human RightsWatch 18(1), 6.
Becker, J. (2006). Tiger at the door. The Guardian.
Bourdieu, P. (1984).Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Harvard University Press.
Bradimore, A., & Bauder, H. (2012). Mystery ships and risky boat people: Tamil refugee migration in the newsprint media.
Canadian Journal of Communication, 36(4), 367–661.
Brand, L. A. (2006). Citizens abroad: Emigration and the state in theMiddle East and North Africa. Cambridge University Press.
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2008).Diasporas and development: Exploring the potential. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2011). Diasporas and conflict societies: Conflict entrepreneurs, competing interests or contributors to sta-
bility and development? Conflict, Security & Development, 11(02), 115–43.
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2016). Institutional reform and diaspora entrepreneurs: The in-between advantage. Oxford University Press.
Brun, C., & Van Hear, N. (2012). Between the local and the diasporic: The shifting centre of gravity in war-torn Sri Lanka’s
transnational politics. Contemporary South Asia, 20(1), 61–75.
Chaudhary, A. R., & Moss, D. M. (2019). Suppressing transnationalism: Bringing constraints into the study of transnational
political action. Comparative Migration Studies, 7(1), 9.
Chikanda, Abel, Jonathan C., &MargaretW-R. (2016).Diasporas, development and governance. Springer.
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war.Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–95.
Ontario Council for International Cooperation (2015). Cultural communities for sustainable development consultation
Report. Retrieved from http://www.ocic.on.ca/what-we-do/influence-and-inspire/cultural-communities-for-sustainable-
development-consultation/
Ontario Council for International Cooperation (2016). OCIC submission to the international assistance review. Retrieved from
http://www.ocic.on.ca/what-we-do/influence-and-inspire/ocic-submission-to-the-international-assistance-review/
Craven, C. R. (2018). Thinking about governance through diasporas: Decentering the state and challenging the external/internal
binary. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 76, DFG-Sonderforschungsbereich 700 “Governance in Areas of Lim-
ited Statehood”.
Dalmasso, E., Del Sordi, A., Glasius, M., Hirt, N., Michaelsen, M., Mohammad, A. S., &Moss, D. (2017). Intervention: Extraterri-
torial authoritarian power. Political Geography, 30, 1e10.
Darieva, T. (2017). Journey to the future: Imaginaries and motivations for homeland trips among diasporic Armenians. Global
Networks, 17(3), 423–440.
De Haas, H. (2010). Migration and development: A theoretical perspective 1. International Migration Review, 44(1), 227–
264.
DeLanda,M., (2016). Assemblage theory. Edinburgh University Press.
Délano, A. (2014). The diffusion of diaspora engagement policies: A Latin American agenda. Political Geography, 41, 90–100.
Délano, A., & Gamlen, A. (2014). Comparing and theorizing state–diaspora relations. Political Geography, 41, 43–53.
Délano Alonso, A., & Mylonas, H. (2017). The microfoundations of diaspora politics: Unpacking the state and disaggregating
the diaspora. Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies, 45, 473–491.
20 CRAVEN
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. (2012). Driving inclusive economic growth: The role of
the private sector in international development. Canadian House of Commons.
Demmers, J. (2002). Diaspora and conflict: Locality, long-distance nationalism, and delocalisation of conflict dynamics. Javnost
- The Public, 9(1):85–96.
Dickinson, J. (2017). The political geographies of diaspora strategies: Rethinking the ‘sending state’.Geography Compass, 11(2),
e12305.
Dittmer, J. (2017).Diplomatic material: Affect, assemblage, and foreign policy. Duke University Press.
Eagleton-Pierce, M. (2018). Professionalizing protest: Scientific capital and advocacy in trade politics. International Political
Sociology, 12(3), 233–255.
Eagleton-Pierce, M. (2020). The rise of managerialism in international NGOs. Review of International Political Economy, 27(4),
970–994.
Eichhorst, K. (2007). Vom Umgang mit Störenfrieden: Staatliche und nichtstaatliche Gewaltakteure als Spoilers in Frieden-
sprozessen amBeispiel Sri Lankas. Sicherheit und Frieden (S+ F)/Security and Peace, 25(4), 170–177.
Erel, U. (2010). Migrating cultural capital: Bourdieu inmigration studies. Sociology, 44(4), 642–660.
Freeze, C. (2001). Bullets fly as Tamil gang war flares.. The Globe andMail.
Gamlen, A. (2014). Diaspora institutions and diaspora governance. International Migration Review, 48, S180–S217.
Gamlen, A. (2019).Human geopolitics: States, emigrants, and the rise of diaspora institutions. Oxford University Press.
Gamlen, A., Cummings,M., Vaaler, P. M., & Rossouw, L. (2013). Explaining the rise of diaspora institutions. Working Paper No. 17,
InternationalMigration Institute, University of Oxford.
Glasius, M. (2018). Extraterritorial authoritarian practices: A framework.Globalizations, 15(2), 179–197.
Godwin, M. (2018). Winning, Westminster-style: Tamil diaspora interest group mobilisation in Canada and the UK. Journal of
Ethnic andMigration Studies, 44(8), 1325–1340.
Gunasingam,M. (2014).Diaspora Tamils from Sri Lanka: A global study. SydneyMVPublications, South Asian Studies Centre.
Guyot, L. (2018). Diasporas as autonomous political actors: The case of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.World of diasporas: Dif-
ferent perceptions on the concept of diaspora (pp. 76–85). Brill Rodopi.
Helweg, ArthurW. (1983). Emigrant remittances: Their nature and impact on a Punjabi village. Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 10(3):435–443.
Ho, E. L.-E. (2011). Claiming the diaspora: Elite mobility, sending state strategies and the spatialities of citizenship. Progress in
Human Geography, 35(6), 757–772.
Ho, E. L.-E., & Boyle, M. (2015). Migration-as-development repackaged? The globalizing imperative of the Singaporean state’s
diaspora strategies. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 36(2), 164–182.
Horst, C. (2018). Making a difference inMogadishu? Experiences of multi-sited embeddedness among diaspora youth. Journal
of Ethnic andMigration Studies, 44(8), 1341–1356.
Jeyapal, D. (2013). Since when did we have 100,000 Tamils? Media representations of race thinking, spatiality, and the 2009
Tamil diaspora protests. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 38(4), 557–578.
Jeyapal, D. (2014). Transnational activism and evolving media discourses of Canadian humanitarianism. Transnational Social
Review, 4(1), 101–104.
Jones, C., Hesterly, W. S., & Borgatti, S. P. (1997). A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions and social
mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 911–945.
Karabegović, D. (2017). Bosnia abroad: Transnational diasporamobilization (PhD Thesis). University ofWarwick.
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Transnational advocacy networks in the movement society. The social movement society: Con-
tentious politics for a new century (pp. 217–238). Cornell University Press
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. International Social
Science Journal, 51(159), 89–101.
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (2014). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Cornell University Press.
Keil, R. (2020). After Suburbia: research and action in the suburban century.Urban Geography, 41(1), pp. 1–20.
Koinova, M. (2017). Beyond statist paradigms: Sociospatial positionality and diaspora mobilization in international relations.
International Studies Review 19(4), 597–621.
Koinova,M. (2018).Diasporamobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction: Contextual and comparative dimensions. Tay-
lor & Francis.
Koinova, M., & Tsourapas, G. (2018). How do countries of origin engage migrants and diasporas? Multiple actors and comparative
perspectives. SAGE Publications.
Krishnamurti, S. (2013). Queue-jumpers, terrorists, breeders: Representations of Tamil migrants in Canadian popular media.
South Asian Diaspora, 5(1), 139–157.
Kuschminder, K., & Siegel, M. (2011). Understanding Ethiopian diaspora engagement policy. MERIT Working Papers 2011–
040, United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology
(MERIT), available at https://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/unumer/2011040.html.
NETWORKSDONOT FLOAT FREELY 21
Kuschminder, K., & Siegel, M. (2016). Rejected Afghan asylum seekers in the Netherlands: Migration experiences, current sit-
uations and future aspirations. UNU-MeritWorking Paper 7.
Kuznetsov, Y. (2006).Diaspora networks and the international migration of skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad. The
World Bank.
Laffey,M., &Nadarajah, S. (2012). The hybridity of liberal peace: States, diasporas and insecurity. Security Dialogue,43(5), 403–
420.
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The Production of Space. Wiley-Blackwell.
Lyons, T. (2007). Conflict-generateddiasporas and transnational politics in Ethiopia.Conflict, Security &Development,7(4), 529–
549.
Marlow, I., Stancu, H., & Baute, N. (2009). Tamil protest moves off Gardiner to Queen’s Park. The Toronto Star.
Minto-Coy, I. D. (2016). Diaspora engagement for development in the Caribbean. Diasporas, development and governance (pp.
121–139). Springer.
Mohamed-Saleem, A. (2016 ). What’s Diaspora got to do with it? Sri Lanka’s Reconciliation Process. ISAS Insights, Institute of
South Asian Studies National University of Singapore 367 (November).
Mohamoud, A. A. (2005).Mobilising African diaspora for the promotion of peace in Africa.African Diaspora Policy Centre. https:
//www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/MobilisingAfricanD.pdf.
Mylonas, H. (2013). The politics of nation-building: Making co-nationals, refugees, and minorities. Cambridge University Press.
Newland, K., & Patrick, E. (2004). Beyond remittances: The role of diaspora in poverty reduction in their countries of origin, a scoping
study by theMigration Policy Institute for the Department of International Development. Migration Policy Institute.
Newman, E., & Richmond, O. (2006). Peace building and spoilers: Opinion. Conflict, Security & Development 6(1), 101–110.
Nexon, D. H., & Pouliot, V. (2013). Things of Networks: Situating ANT in international relations. International Political Sociology,
7(3), 342–345.
Orjuela, C. (2008). Distant warriors, distant peace workers? Multiple diaspora roles in Sri Lanka’s violent conflict. Global Net-
works, 8(4), 436–452.
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